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THEY KNOW IT WHEN THEY SEE IT:
COPYRIGHT AND AESTHETICS IN THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
JAMES H. CARTER*
The Second Circuit is widely recognized as the nation's most
important copyright court. Centered in the capital city of publish-
ing and the arts, and mindful of the proud tradition of copyright
scholars who have formed its treasure of precedent, the court regu-
larly hears appeals raising issues in the forefront of copyright
developments.
The Second Circuit is not shy about its historic leadership role
in shaping U.S. copyright law. Indeed, judges of the court have
been active in submitting testimony to Congress on copyright mat-
ters and in scholarly comment.1 But in one regard, the court has
been quite modest: the expression of aesthetic judgments2 concern-
ing the works that come before it in copyright actions. Second Cir-
cuit judges regularly note that they are not passing judgment on
the literary or artistic quality of such works, but merely on other
aspects as required by the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Copyright
Act" or the "Act").3 Indeed, they strive for rules of decision that
* B.A. 1965, LL.B. 1969, Yale University. James H. Carter is a partner in the New York
office of the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. He was a law clerk to Judge Robert P. Ander-
son of the Second Circuit, 1969-70.
, See Judges' Testimony at Joint Hearing on Fair Use of Unpublished Works, 40 PAT.
TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT J. 253 (July 19, 1990) (reprinting statements of Chief Judge Oakes
and Judge Miner of Second Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as statement of Judge Leval of
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, at Joint Hearing of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the
Administration of Justice and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks regarding H.R. 4263 and S. 2370). For recent scholarly
comment on fair use by judges of the Second Circuit, see Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text:
Fair Use or Foul Play?, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1990); Newman, Not the End of History:
The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 12 (1990); Oakes, Copy-
rights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 983 (1990).
2 Aesthetics is "a branch of philosophy dealing with the nature of beauty, art, and taste
and with the creation and appreciation of beauty"; it may also mean "a particular theory or
conception of beauty or art," or "a pleasing appearance or effect." WmSTER's NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 61 (1983).
See, e.g., New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659, 661 (2d
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seem to be removed from aesthetic judgments.
The Copyright Act provides guideposts to decisions but only
limited help in answering questions about specific works. The body
of case law nevertheless is large enough and consistent enough to
supply guidance for most types of situations that arise, and courts
are mindful of the particular need to clarify the application of
copyright principles through case law. But in some instances, this
effort proves difficult because the distinction being drawn is closely
related to what strikes the judges as "art"-a matter not easily ar-
ticulated and a subject of some discomfort to the judiciary. Exam-
ples of such situations can be found in the Second Circuit's recent
cases involving at least three copyright issues: fair use, factual
compilations, and utilitarian design.
Cases in these areas may require a distinction to be drawn be-
tween material that is, on the one hand, creative, artistic and ex-
pressive, the product of intellectual effort-and therefore pre-
sumptively subject to copyright protection-and material that is
merely a series of statements of fact, clich6s lacking in originality,
expression used in some "essentially factual" way, a compilation of
"diligently collected" facts, or functional industrial design. Judges
can deal with these matters in either one of two ways. The first is
by enunciating detailed criteria and seeking to apply them in a
manner that may be seen as resting upon the judges' own judicial
aesthetics: their conceptions of what is art or, more generally, of
what is creative and expressive literary work for purposes of the
Copyright Act. Alternatively, judges may postulate sweeping prin-
ciples that purport to be rules of decision but actually are largely
impenetrable, allowing a court in effect to say, "I know it when I
see it, and that's it."
Though they uniformly deny performing the role of literary or
Cir. 1989) (Miner, J.) ("[m]oreover, I question whether judges, rather than literary critics,
should decide whether literary material is used to enliven a test or demonstrate truth"),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105, 108
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Walker, J.) ("[r]egardless of its critical reception in the literary
world-and it is not for this court to pass on its literary merits-Walker's book remains,
without doubt, a work of criticism and scholarship"); see also New Era Publications Int'l,
ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1506 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Leval, J.) ("[i]t is an
uncomfortable role for courts to serve as literary critics, passing on whether a purported
work of history, teaching or criticism is entitled to respect as such. We judges generally lack
both competence and the necessary information to form such opinions"), aff'd, 873 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990); infra text accompanying note 107 (quot-
ing Judge Mansfield on aesthetics).
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art critics, some of the distinctions copyright judges make neces-
sarily lie close to those fields of endeavor. Indeed, courts regularly
take account of published literary or art criticism of the works
before them for various purposes when such criticism is consistent
with their own judgments. When judges of the Second Circuit face
distinctions based in part on aesthetic judgments, they sometimes
seek to explain how their own aesthetic senses are involved and at
other times retreat to an "I know it when I see it" position. On the
whole, however, the circuit's jurisprudence appears to be moving
toward articulation of decisions made at the intersection of law
and aesthetics, as should be expected of the nation's leading copy-
right court.
I. FAIR USE
Fair use has been the most controversial copyright issue in re-
cent Second Circuit jurisprudence, invoking both judicial4 and ex-
trajudicial5 comment by members of the court.
Fair use is a privilege to use copyrighted material in a reasona-
ble manner without consent, notwithstanding the copyright mo-
nopoly granted to the owner." It is not precisely defined in the law
but is codified to an extent in section 107 of the Copyright Act,
which is intended to set forth (but not list exhaustively) the judi-
cially established principles of fair use.7 Fair use thus includes use
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search .... In determining whether the use made of a work in
4 See, e.g., New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152,
155-61 (2d Cir.) (discussing fair use doctrine), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 297 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter New Era II]; New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 580-85
(2d Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990) [hereinafter New Era I]; Salinger
v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94-100 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 206-17 (2d Cir.
1983) (same), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
1 See supra note 1 (extrajudicial commentary of Second Circuit judges). The literature
also includes the views of District Court Judge Leval. See Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The
Nineteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 36 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 167 (1989); Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1990); see also Weinreb, Fair's Fair:
A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1137 (1990) (responding to latter
article by Judge Leval).
' Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547, 549-55 (1985);
New Era II, 904 F.2d at 155-60.
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any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.8
In addition, courts sometimes have considered other factors not
enumerated in the statute, including any "bad faith" of the copy-
right user or, conversely, the extent to which a copyright violation
is being asserted by an author in an attempt to suppress a work
critical of him or herself.9
The Second Circuit has developed a well-articulated body of
fair use jurisprudence covering most subjects.10 Among other
things, the court historically has been relatively tolerant toward
claims of fair use involving copying of portions of unpublished
materials for use in nonfiction publications. A series of noted cases
has considered the use of unpublished letters in biographies of
Howard Hughes11 and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,12 the reproduc-
tion of portions of the Zapruder film of President John F. Ken-
nedy's assassination, 13 and The Nation's unauthorized publication
8 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
' See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1264 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting
that "bad faith by the user of copyrighted material suggests unfairness"), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1059 (1987); New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493,
1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that "efforts to suppress critical biography through the copy-
right injunction have generally not succeeded"), aff'd, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
10 See, e.g., Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 522-26 (2d
Cir. 1991) (standardized test); New Era II, 904 F.2d at 155-60 (critical biography); Weiss-
man v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1323-26 (2d Cir.) (scientific research and publication), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989); Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 146-48
(2d Cir. 1984) (letter); DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir.
1982) (comic book figures); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252,
253 (2d Cir. 1980) (musical parody); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1979) (cheerleading uniforms).
" See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
12 See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1063 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978).
" See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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of parts of President Gerald R. Ford's autobiography"'-finding, in
each instance, fair use. The string was broken in 1985, however,
when the United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises, involving President Ford's autobiography, stating in so
doing that "the unpublished nature of a work is [a] key, though
not necessarily determinative factor" in negating a fair use de-
fense" and that "the fact that a work is unpublished is a critical
element of its 'nature.' ,1"7 This reversal has led to a period of un-
certainty in the Second Circuit in cases involving copying of un-
published materials such as letters or journals.1 8
In Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,19 the court upheld re-
clusive author J.D. Salinger's right to bar use of excerpts from
more than forty of his unpublished letters in an unauthorized biog-
raphy. The court referred to the Supreme Court's Harper & Row
opinion, adding: "[W]e think that the tenor of the Court's entire
discussion of unpublished works conveys the idea that such works
normally enjoy complete protection against copying any protected
expression. '20
In 1989-90, the court returned to the subject of use of unpub-
lished works in a pair of cases involving quotations and paraphras-
ing of letters and other writings of Scientology founder L. Ron
Hubbard in two critical biographies. In the first of these cases,
New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co.
("New Era 1"),21 the court rejected a fair use justification for the
biographer's copying of both published and unpublished material,
but nevertheless affirmed the district court's denial of an injunc-
tion against publication of the book because the plaintiff had
delayed in bringing the action. The majority opinion in New Era I
also commented in strong terms on the copyright protection of un-
published materials against unauthorized quotation or close
paraphrase:
" Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
15 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
" Id. at 554.
1 Id. at 564.
'6 See Miner, supra note 1, at 8-11.
811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
20 Id. at 97. Some of the letters were written to Judge Learned Hand. Id. at 92.
21 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
1991]
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[W]e made it clear in Salinger that unpublished works normally
enjoy complete protection .... Where use is made of materials of
an "unpublished nature," the second fair use factor [nature of the
copyrighted work] has yet to be applied in favor of an infringer,
and we do not do so here.22
After a period of public hue and cry about the likely restric-
tive effects of these decisions on the efforts of authors of bio-
graphic and historical works,23 and a substantial amount of com-
mentary by judges concerning the logic underlying copyright policy
aspects of various opinions,24 the court revisited fair use in New
Era Publications International, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group
("New Era II"1).25 In that case, copying of documents in a book
about Scientology and L. Ron Hubbard was held to be fair use.
The court seemed to give particular weight to the critical nature of
the biography (by a former Scientology follower whose views had
changed) and held that a quotation of expressive material (which
in this case had been published previously by Mr. Hubbard) had
been fairly used to demonstrate facts about the writer's
character.26
The chilling effect of the Harper & Row decision on judicial
approval of fair use defenses for copying of unpublished works
seems to have split the Second Circuit into two camps, at least
insofar as analytical technique is concerned: one favors a relatively
broad-brush approach, whereas the other looks to itemized dissec-
22 Id. at 583.
22 See, e.g., Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REv. 299,
302-10, 321-23 (1991) (noting legal restrictions on activities of biographers and "brouhaha
surrounding the judicial decisions and the congressional hearings"); Note, Remedies for
Copyright Infringement: Respecting the First Amendment, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1940, 1949-
55 (1989) (discussing conflict between copyright and first amendment). The reaction to Sa-
linger led to the introduction of proposed legislation which would have provided that fair
use is to be determined in the same way for unpublished works as it is for published works,
and members of the court submitted testimony on this bill. See supra note 1. The bill failed
in the 101st Congress but has been reintroduced in a somewhat different form. The 1991
proposal (S. 1035) would add a sentence at the end of 17 U.S.C. § 107:
The fact that a work is unpublished is an important element which tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use, but shall not diminish the importance traditionally
accorded to any other consideration under this section, and shall not bar a finding
of fair use, if such finding is made upon full consideration of all of the above
factors.
42 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1031, at 44 (May 16, 1991).
:4 See supra note 1.
22 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 297 (1990).
" Id. at 157-58, 160-61.
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tion of literary work. In order to temper what has been seen as the
"complete" protection of unpublished material, members of both
groups have pointed to a series of fact-expression distinctions that
draw them into aesthetics. These fact-expression distinctions en-
able the court to reason, in appropriate cases, that the challenged
use does not involve a core work of expression but, rather, material
of a less expressive nature for which some flexibility may be al-
lowed. The result is an increased scope for fair use.
Since facts themselves are not subject to copyright protec-
tion,27 courts traditionally have examined the material being cop-
ied to determine whether it is a statement of fact or expression.
But further judgments about facts and expression can be made.
First, a distinction may be found between works that are in their
entirety "essentially factual in nature"2 8 or "primarily informa-
tional rather than creative. ' 29 Second, even if the material is ex-
pressive, it may be subjected to fair use if the second author is
using only statements of fact from the work, rather than what is
regarded as the first author's expression." Third, even unpublished
works may be subject to legitimate fair use by subsequent authors
(although the law is not yet clear) if "copying is necessary fairly
and accurately to report a fact set forth in the author's writings" 31
or "primarily for informational purposes. 3 2
One commentator on Second Circuit fair use decisions has
noted the court's oscillation between a "dissection ap-
proach"-which first excludes uncopyrightable ideas, facts, and
clich6 phrases before looking at the use of anything not so classi-
fied-and a "totality approach"-which characterizes all of the
material copied as essentially expression (or not) before proceeding
to apply the statutory fair use tests.33 In Harper & Row, Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,34 the Second Circuit dissected the
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
2' New Era II, 904 F.2d at 157 (quoting Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253,
1263 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987)).
29 Id. (quoting Consumers Union of United States v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984)).
20 See, e.g., Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96.
21 New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659, 662 (2d Cir.
1989) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
2 Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
3 See Note, Fair Use of Unpublished Materials in the Second Circuit: The Letters of
the Law, 54 BROOKLYN L. RE v. 417, 448-52 (1988).
3, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), reo'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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copied work of President Ford and found key portions factual and
unprotected;3 5 the Supreme Court looked at the totality of the
work and disagreed.3 6 In Salinger, however, the Second Circuit re-
jected the district court's dissection and instead viewed the copied
work in its totality, finding the copyright infringed.37
In its more recent cases, the Second Circuit has tended to fol-
low the lead of Harper & Row in using the language of "totality";
but in doing so, it has gradually expanded the scope of what is
sufficiently "factual" to allow wider scope for fair use. In New Era
I, as in Salinger, the court's majority again rejected the district
court's highly dissective approach, which had looked painstakingly
at each passage used and had distinguished the use of expression
to "enliven" a text from its use with "convincing justification" to
illustrate an argument or in some other way truly necessary to
achieve the biographer's "point of significance. '3s The majority
found that the district court's analysis smacked too much of liter-
ary criticism (in which judges should not engage) and relied on a
distinction that was "unnecessary and unwarranted."3 9 After en
banc consideration, four dissenting members of the court neverthe-
less expressed approval of dissection. 0
In New Era II, the Second Circuit adhered to the totality ap-
proach. 41 The district court's opinion constituted a somewhat dif-
ferent type of literary dissection, testing whether each bit of copied
work was used "as a literary device rather than as a basis for criti-
cal study. ' 42 The Second Circuit's opinion articulated more fully
its preference for a nondissecting method of analysis and placed all
of the copied material as a whole in a single category.43 The differ-
bnce was that in this instance the work copied-which included
some of Mr. Hubbard's poetry-was termed entirely "factual or in-
" See id. at 202-09.
36 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569.
'v See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97-98.
38 New Era I, 873 F.2d at 583.
39 Id.
" See New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659, 662-63 (2d
Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990). Chief Judge Oakes,
as well as Judges Kearse and Winter, joined Judge Newman in dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc. Id. at 662 (Newman, J., dissenting).
" See New Era II, 904 F.2d at 155.
'2 New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group, 729 F. Supp. 992, 996
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct 297
(1990).
'" New Era II, 904 F.2d at 157.
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formational."'44 The court wrote: "We have some hesitation in try-
ing to characterize Hubbard's diverse body of writings as solely
'factual' or 'non-factual,' but on balance, we believe that the
quoted works-which deal with Hubbard's life, his views on reli-
gion, human relations, the Church, etc.-are more properly viewed
as factual or informational. ' 45 The material, excerpts from pub-
lished works, thus provided a generous scope for fair use.
The dissection/totality dichotomy reappeared in a decision by
Judge Walker of the Second Circuit in Wright v. Warner Books,
Inc. 46 In that action, involving use of copyrighted unpublished let-
ters in a biography of deceased novelist Richard Wright, Judge
Walker took a dissection approach similar to that taken by the dis-
trict judge and the Second Circuit dissenters in New Era L The
Wright court reviewed the copied material quotation by quotation
to eliminate factual matter, and that which remained was found
subject to fair use because it was "used more for primarily infor-
mational, rather than creative purposes. '4 Although noting the
Salinger rule that unpublished work "normally" enjoyed "com-
plete" protection, Judge Walker held that Salinger still permitted
a distinction between fact and expression. 48 Because the material
was used by the biographer "not to recreate Wright's creative ex-
pression, but simply to establish facts necessary to her biogra-
phy,' '49 the fair use defense was upheld.
While the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit does not
yet seem to have elaborated a consistent approach toward the use
of unpublished copyrighted works, its members have been creative
in the use of both the totality and the dissection techniques to pro-
44 Id.
41 Id. A variation of the same theme occurs in a slightly earlier case, Maxtone-Graham
v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987), involving
copying of some 7,000 words from a book of essentially verbatim interviews with women who
had chosen abortions or adoption written by an author commenting on the abortion issue
from a social perspective antagonistic to the first author. The court recognized that the
original work, K. MAXTONE-GRAHAm, PREGNANT By MISTAKE (1973), was more than the prod-
uct of "diligence" without expressive content, since it "like all interviews contains elements
of creative journalistic effort." Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1262. Still, the court found
Pregnant by Mistake essentially factual in nature and on that basis accorded the subse-
quent author sufficient latitude to find fair use.
41 748 F. Supp. 105, 109-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Walker, J., sitting by designation as a
district judge).
47 Id. at 111.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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vide some flexibility for fair use. Under the former, a court may
style all of the copied material as on the whole "factual or informa-
tional"; under the latter, even expressive copied material can be
trimmed down to exclude the factual or cliched, and then the resi-
due may be described as used fairly to "establish facts" in the
copyright user's work.
All three techniques require judgments about such matters as
what is "informational" or "clich6," or what is a use of copied ma-
terial to "establish facts" rather than "enliven" a biographer's
prose. These issues all could be characterized as largely aesthetic.
In effect, if the court determines that a use seems "fair" under all
the circumstances, there is ample room to employ such techniques
to fit within the rules laid down by the Supreme Court in Harper
& Row. In their opinions, the judges of the Second Circuit seem
uncomfortable with these aesthetic issues; but the result of recent
cases seems to be a trend toward articulated fair use criteria and,
in addition, a gradual return to reasonably generous interpretation
of fair use after the unsettling effects of Harper & Row. The only
book challenged and then enjoined in the Second Circuit in recent
years, it should be remembered, was the Salinger biography.50 The
basis for a finding of fair use of unpublished letters by a biogra-
pher may be hard to articulate, and some judges still balk at
phrasing them in terms that might be seen as literary criticism. All
the same, the court seems to be moving away from a broad-brush
approach barring examination of nuance.
II. FACTUAL COMPILATIONS
The Second Circuit also has brought aesthetic judgments to
bear on questions of copyright law involving factual compilations.
The rules for determining the extent of protection for works such
as telephone directories, case law reports, statistical collections,
and-more recently-computer databases have provided fertile
ground for litigation and scholarly comment.5 1
60 See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100. The Salinger biography was published after two years
of litigation, without the material found to be infringing.
51 See, e.g., Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516 passim (1981) (examining various ap-
proaches to factual compilations and suggesting express recognition of property interest in
factual compilations to ensure unified approach); Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial
Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865 passim
(1990) (discussing historical and contemporary protection of factual compilations, and sug-
[Vol. 65:773
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As in the case of fair use, the Copyright Act provides only gen-
eral guidance for factual compilations. The Act, like the United
States Constitution, grants a limited monopoly for a term of years
to an "author":5 2 a person who is the creator of a work entitled to
copyright. The Act provides for, but fails fully to define, copyright
of compilations of materials that themselves would be facts not
subject to copyright. The Act defines compilations as works
"formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials
or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship. ' 53 An "original work" thus is necessary; and because
copyright protection is available only for expression and not for
ideas or the facts and information that are contained in a compila-
tion, mere "diligent collection" of unprotectable facts does not nec-
essarily result in a compilation with any copyrightable content. As
a consequence, "[c]opyright law and compilations are uneasy
bedfellows. ' '5 4
Courts have grappled for decades with the extent to which a
factual compilation must involve creativity. Some have found an
element of creativity necessary,55 while others have relied on the
"diligence" or "sweat of the brow" of the creators of factual
gesting alternatives); Jones, Factual Compilations and the Second Circuit, 52 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 679 passim (1986) (arguing that Second Circuit's view on nonfiction compilation is
unwarranted and unwise); Patterson & Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copy-
right Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719 pas-
sim (1989) (analyzing recent litigation involving copyright protection of computer databases
and suggesting that copyright be treated as closely regulated statutory monopoly); Note,
Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations-Reviving the Misappropriation Doctrine,
56 FORDHAM L. REV. 933 passim (1988) (arguing that copyright, not state misappfopriation,
law should govern factual compilations, but that application of copyright law to factual
compilations should be clarified); Note, Copyright Protection for Compilations of Fact:
Does the Originality Standard Allow Protection on the Basis of Industrious Collection?, 62
NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 763 passim (1987) (arguing that copyright protection of factual compi-
lations should hinge not upon author's industriousness, but rather upon arrangement and
originality of work).
62 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
n Id. § 101.
" Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984).
11 See, e.g., Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 201 n.2 (9th Cir.
1989) (court agreed with defendant's argument that amount of work expended by plaintiff
did not resolve question of copyrightability); Miller v. Universal Cities Studios, 650 F.2d
1365, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1981) (copyright rests "on the originality of the selection and ar-
rangement of the factual material, rather than on the industriousness of the efforts to de-
velop the information").
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compilations in finding such compilations copyrightable.58 In 1991,
the United States Supreme Court addressed this matter in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,57 a case involv-
ing telephone directories, holding that "originality, not 'sweat of
the brow,' is the touchstone of copyright protection in directories
and other fact-based works. '58 The Court held that "choices as to
selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently
by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are suffi-
ciently original" to merit copyright protection.59 However, the
Court also noted that "[t]here remains a narrow category of works
in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be
virtually nonexistent" 60 and that alphabetical arrangement of
names with corresponding addresses and telephone numbers in a
white page directory was "devoid of even the slightest trace of cre-
ativity."61 The Court explained that such arrangement "is an age-
old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it
has come to be expected as a matter of course. '8 2
In the Second Circuit, there has been no reluctance to take
sides in this debate: an element of creativity is necessary, and, al-
though the court did not venture to articulate a definition prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Feist, it appears to "know it when
it sees it." 6 The court stated its view on factual compilations in
two 1984 cases, Eckes v. Card Prices Update64 and Financial In-
86 See, e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 131-
32 (8th Cir. 1985) (focus for determining originality should be "whether the [work] is de-
rived from information compiled and generated by [plaintiff's] efforts"); Schroder v. Wil-
liam Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) ("'industrious collection,' not originality in
the sense of novelty, is required"); Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing
Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir.) (copyright protection afforded because of hard work that went
into compiling facts), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
87 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
88 Id. at 1295.
:8 Id. at 1289.
8 Id. at 1294.
68 Id. at 1296.
62 Id. at 1297.
6 Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I know it
[hard-core pornography] when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
that"). In an earlier era, the Second Circuit created what the United States Supreme Court
in Feist characterized as "the classic formulation of the 'sweat of the brow' doctrine" in
Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922), but repudiated it thereafter. See Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1291; see also
supra note 56 (examples of cases that have relied on "sweat of brow" doctrine).
64 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
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formation, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 65 The first in-
volved baseball cards: the author of a soft-covered book entitled
"Sport Americana Baseball Card Price Guide" sued the publisher
of a competing work entitled "Card Prices Update."6 6 The plain-
tiff's work was a comprehensive listing of some 18,000 baseball
cards, with estimates of market values for each.17 The defendant's
product was a subsequent and more limited monthly "update" of
prices for certain selected valuable cards-substantially those sep-
arately designated by plaintiff's guide as "premium" cards. 8 The
trial court found the guide to card prices protectable by copyright
and rejected defendant's arguments that it had not copied plain-
tiff's data. 9 It nevertheless found that the prices quoted in the two
publications were "not so substantially similar as to justify a find-
ing of copyright infringement. '7
The court of appeals agreed that the plaintiff's selection of
5,000 cards as "premium" cards created a copyrightable compila-
tion, and it found adequate evidence of infringement.71 Writing for
the court, Judge Feinberg noted that subjective selection and ar-
rangement of information may be protected, and then stated, with-
out explanation, that there was "no doubt that appellants exer-
cised selection, creativity and judgment in choosing among the
18,000 or so different baseball cards in order to determine which
were the 5,000 premium cards. '72
Moody's Investors involved the "Financial Daily Called Bond
Service," which consisted of packets of four-inch by six-inch index
cards mailed daily to subscribers and which reported on municipal
and corporate bonds "called" (or redeemed) by their issuers.73 The
information-consisting of such data as the name of the issuer of
the bonds, the series of bonds being called, the date and price of
redemption, and the name of the trustee or paying agent-was ob-
05 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors
Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986) (1984 case on remand), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820
(1987).
11 Eckes, 736 F.2d at 860.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 861.
Eckes v. Suffolk Collectables & C.P.U., 575 F. Supp. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd
sub nom. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
71 Id. at 464.
71 Eckes, 736 F.2d at 863.
72 Id.
71 Moody's Investors, 751 F.2d at 502.
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tained principally from reading newspapers.74 This was no small
effort because Financial Information Inc.'s employees were re-
quired to look through newspapers from all over the country and
clip paid notices of calls placed locally by bond issuers." However,
the court stated that "[tihere is apparently little, if any, editorial
skill or creative discretion involved; the cards are essentially a
compilation of financial facts collected from various sources, the
key facts being those selected for publication. 7 6 Financial Infor-
mation sued Moody's Investors Service, Inc., which published simi-
lar data on called bonds in a different but "overlapping" format. 77
Moody's presented evidence of its "independent creation" of its
own data, which the trial court rejected.78 The district court also
held the cards copyrightable, but upheld a fair use defense. 9
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Oakes, rejected
the fair use defense.80 On remand, the district court found that the
bond cards did not constitute a copyrightable compilation;s' and
on a second appeal, the court of appeals agreed.8 2 Judge Lumbard
noted, as had the Eckes court, the Second Circuit's "well-estab-
lished reluctance to grant copyright protection to works of non-
fiction-chiefly on the ground that facts may not be copy-
righted. '8 3 His opinion continued:
The statute thus requires that copyrightability not be determined
by the amount of effort the author expends, but rather by the
nature of the final result. To grant copyright protection based
merely on the "sweat of the author's brow" would risk putting
large areas of factual research material off limits and threaten the
public's unrestrained access to information. 4
In applying these principles to the bond cards, the court de-
ferred to the trial judge's factual determination that the plaintiff's
74 Id.
"7 Id.
76 Id.
" Id. at 502-03.
71 Id. at 503.
79 Id. at 503-04.
80 Id. at 510.
81 Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207-08 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
11 Id. at 208.
83 Id. at 207.
84 Id.
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work did not constitute an "independent creation." ' Indeed, the
court noted, "The researchers had five facts to fill in on each
card-nothing more and nothing less."8 6 Since the cards did not
embody creativity, either individually or collectively, their compi-
lation was not copyrightable.
In a pair of cases decided after Feist, the Second Circuit dealt
further with the application of the "minimal degree of creativity"
test articulated there. In Kregos v. Associated Press,87 the court
held that a baseball pitching form distributed to newspapers by
the plaintiff containing nine categories of data about past perform-
ances of the pitchers scheduled to start each game to be played
that day may qualify for limited copyright protection with respect
to the selection of particular categories of data, but not as to the
arrangement of the categories on a form.8 The Second Circuit, in
an opinion by Judge Newman, found that Kregos had selected the
nine items of information concerning pitchers' performances from
a universe of data containing many other items not selected, so
that there was a factual question for trial as to the sufficiency of
the creativity involved to avoid being, in the words of Feist, "en-
tirely typical," 'garden variety," or "obvious."89 However, the
court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the arrange-
ment of the selected statistics in a form was an "obvious" organiza-
tion into columns analyzing each pitcher's performance for the sea-
son, against the day's opponent, and finally the pitcher's recent
starts.9 0
Two days later, in Victor Lalli Enterprises v. Big Red Apple,
Inc., 91 the court affirmed a grant of summary judgment holding
that charts published for use by gamblers who attempted to select
daily "lucky numbers" that were derived from activity at local
horse racing tracks lacked sufficient creativity to merit copyright
protection.2 The court again emphasized that the data itself were
not protected and held that the selection, coordination, and ar-
rangement of the information failed to meet the "minimal creativ-
ity" test because the format of the cards was functional and en-
8" Id. at 208.
86 Id.
' 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
See id. at 704-05.
9 Id.
" Id. at 709.
91 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991).
92 Id. at 672-73.
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tirely conventional, while the selection of data was devoid of
creativity.93
In the area of factual compilations, unlike fair use, the Second
Circuit has been reluctant to articulate standards by which to
judge what is sufficiently "creative," but instead has retreated to-
ward broad characterizations. The Feist decision similarly uses
broad language of a conclusory sort. While the court's rejection of
a "sweat of the brow" justification for copyright was clearly stated
and correctly anticipated the Supreme Court's holding, the iota of
creative contribution dividing merely "sweaty" works from "crea-
tive" ones is left either to judicial pronouncement as to what is
"obvious" or, perhaps, to determinations by triers of fact. Deter-
mining what is "creative" and what is not seems necessarily to in-
voke aesthetic discrimination; but it is not clear at present in the
Second Circuit how that function is to be performed.
III. UTILITARIAN DESIGN
A third copyright area in which judges are called upon to exer-
cise aesthetic judgment involves the distinction between protect-
able "works of applied art" and "industrial designs," which are not
subject to copyright protection. The Copyright Act extends its pro-
tections to "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;" 9 which may
include a "useful article" under certain circumstances. Such an ar-
ticle, defined as one "having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information," 95 is considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work under the Act "only if, and only to the extent that, such de-
sign incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article."9 "
This requirement of "conceptual separability"-that an artis-
tic element be distinguishable from the utilitarian function of the
article-has caused various courts, including the Second Circuit,
considerable concern about aesthetics and copyright law. In 1903,
in a case involving the copyrightability of chromolithographs used
" Id. at 673-74.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1988).
g' Id. § 101.
" Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMm. NEws 5659, 5667-68 (explaining terminology).
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on a circus poster, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes announced what
has come to be called the "antidiscrimination" principle, which
dictates that judges should not inject their own aesthetic judg-
ments into copyright decisions "outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits":
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pic-
torial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive
until the public had learned the new language in which their au-
thor spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether
the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end,
copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public
less educated than the judge.97
Judges of the Second Circuit have been careful, in their at-
tempts to devise a test for conceptual separability, to state that
they are as mindful as Justice Holmes of the need to avoid making
aesthetic judgments-at least "outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits." In the first case to come before it raising the issue
under the 1976 Act, Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl,
Inc.,98 the court (in an opinion by now Chief Judge Oakes) ac-
cepted the idea that copyrightability can be based on the "concep-
tual" separation of an artistic element (rather than on only physi-
cal separation) and held that ornamental belt buckles (which were
sold to be worn but also were displayed in the Metropolitan Mu-
seum of Art) passed the test."' The artist testified that he named
one of the buckles "Winchester" because "he saw 'in [his] mind's
eye a correlation between the art nouveau period and the butt of
an antique Winchester rifle.' -1oo Judge Oakes wrote that "[w]e see
... conceptually separable sculptural elements, as apparently have
the buckles' wearers who have used them as ornamentation for
parts of the body other than the waist."10' Expert witnesses testi-
fied that "the buckles rise to the level of creative art. ' 10 2
97Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
98 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
'9 Id. at 993-94.
100 Id. at 991.
101 Id. at 993.
202 Id. at 994.
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District Judge Weinstein, sitting by designation, dissented,
largely on the basis of legislative history. In his view, the Act calls
for essentially physical separability: "the copyright protection cov-
ered only that aspect of the article that was a separately identifi-
able work of art independent of the useful article." 103
The second case, Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover
Corp.,04 involved the copyrightability of mannequins of partial
human torsos used to display articles of clothing. A divided court
held that they were not protected by copyright'0 5 and in the pro-
cess discussed at some length how aesthetic judgments might be
brought to bear on the conceptual separability issue. Judge Mans-
field, joined by Judge Meskill, called attention to Justice Holmes's
"antidiscrimination" principle' and also to legislative history af-
firming that copyright protection was not intended to extend to
even the most "aesthetically satisfying and valuable" article of ap-
plied art or industrial design. 0 6 In answer to the claim that the
mannequins were examples of the traditional art of sculpture,
Judge Mansfield wrote:
We find no support in the statutory language or legislative history
for the claim that merely because a utilitarian article falls within
a traditional art form it is entitled to a lower level of scrutiny in
determining its copyrightability. Recognition of such a claim
would in any event conflict with the antidiscrimination principle
Justice Holmes enunciated in Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co. 107
Without extended explanation, the court found that the man-
nequin features claimed to be aesthetic and artistic were "inextri-
cably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the display of
clothes."' 08 Accordingly, there was no conceptual separability and
no copyright protection.
In dissent, Judge Newman suggested a more detailed test for
conceptual separability. First, however, he noted that the Copy-
right Act apparently vetoes what might be thought to be the most
straightforward test: does the design of a form have "sufficient aes-
103 Id. at 996.
" 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
105 Id. at 419.
100 Id. at 415-18; see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 96, at 5668.
107 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418 (citation omitted).
108 Id. at 419.
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thetic appeal to be appreciated for its artistic qualities." 109 The
House Report, he wrote, clearly requires that the artistic features
must be identified separately from function. 1 0 According to Judge
Newman, "the article must stimulate in the mind of the beholder a
concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian
function"-that is, the "mind's eye" of the beholder must perceive
"two different concepts that are not inevitably entertained simul-
taneously." ' Copyrightability is present "if the concept of the
utilitarian function can be displaced in the observer's mind while
he entertains the separate concept of some non-utilitarian func-
tion. ' 112 The beholder may be able to perceive, for example, an
aesthetically pleasing chair "if the ordinary observer viewing it
would entertain the concept of a work of art in addition to the
concept of a chair."113 Judge Newman also discussed the identity
of the beholder in whose "mind's eye" separability should be
viewed: "I think the relevant beholder must be that most useful
legal personage-the ordinary, reasonable observer. This is the
same person the law enlists to decide other conceptual issues in
copyright law, such as whether an allegedly infringing work bears a
substantial similarity to a copyrighted work."'1 4
The majority rejected Judge Newman's reasonable man's
"mind's eye" test of artistic separability as "a standard so ethereal
as to amount to a 'non-test' that would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to administer or apply. 11 5
The court revisited the conceptual separability issue in
Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.," 6
which involved a bicycle rack made of bent tubing said to have
originated from a minimalist wire sculpture."1  Enlisting professo-
rial commentators in the debate, Judge Oakes, writing for the
court, noted scholarly endorsement for Judge Newman's dissenting
views in Carol Barnhart,"18 but instead himself endorsed the anal-
ysis of another copyright scholar who had elaborated yet a differ-
109 Id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
110 Id.
Id.
112 Id. at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting).
113 Id.
I'l Id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 419 n.5.
1-6 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
11 Id. at 1147.
I's See W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 43-45 (6th ed. 1986).
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ent test.119 The proper standard, Judge Oakes wrote, is whether
"design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's artis-
tic judgment exercised independently of functional influences. 120
This "independent artistic judgment" test appears to focus on
the circumstances and subjective intent of the designer. Judge
Oakes wrote that it is consistent with the court's earlier case law
because the artistic aspects of the belt buckles in Kieselstein-Cord
"reflected purely aesthetic choices, independent of the buckles'
function," while the mannequin torsos in Carol Barnhart "showed
clearly the influence of functional concerns."12' "Though the torsos
bore artistic features," he wrote, "it was evident that the designer
incorporated those features to further the usefulness of the torsos
as mannequins. 122 This test, the court predicted, would be rela-
tively easy to administer in practice because "[tihe work itself will
continue to give 'mute testimony' of its origins.' 23 In addition, evi-
dence would be entertained concerning the "design process" of the
work, "with the trier of fact making the determination whether the
aesthetic design elements are significantly influencel by functional
considerations."12 4
Applying that test to the bicycle rack in question, the court
noted that its creator claimed to have derived it directly from his
sculptures as a separate idea, and that the sculptures had been
conceived originally without any thought to utilitarian application.
The opinion states that "[i]t seems clear that the form of the rack
is influenced in significant measure by utilitarian concerns and
thus any aesthetic elements cannot be said to be conceptually sep-
arable from the utilitarian elements.' 1 25 The court made its own
comparison of the bicycle rack with the earlier sculptures and con-
cluded that this comparison "reveals" that the rack was different
from the sculptural inspiration in various ways and was "in its fi-
nal form essentially a product of industrial design."'' 6 The fact
that the sculpture already existed before the possibility of adapt-
ing it for a functional use was conceived was critical. True to Jus-
"I Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (citing Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A
Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv. 707 (1983)).
120 Id. at 1145.
121 Id.
222 Id.
123 Id.
12, Id. at 1145-46.
125 Id. at 1146-47.
126 Id. at 1147.
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tice Holmes's admonition, the court further noted that whether the
bicycle rack would be considered good art was irrelevant. Rejecting
Judge Newman's suggestion to ask whether an object such as the
rack could "stimulate in the mind of the reasonable observer a
concept separate from the bicycle rack concept," the court decided
that the "harmonious fusion of function and aesthetics" that the
rack represented doomed any hope of copyright protection.
127
Judge Winter dissented from the court's decision to adopt a
test focussing on what he termed "the process or sequence followed
by the particular designer," which "makes copyright protection de-
pend upon largely fortuitous circumstances concerning the creation
of the design in issue. ' 128 As he noted, the bicycle rack easily could
have been conceived before its sculptural inspirations had taken
final form; the sequence was happenstance. 129 Judge Winter en-
dorsed Judge Newman's idea that "the relevant question is
whether the design of a useful article, however intertwined with
the article's utilitarian aspects, causes an ordinary reasonable ob-
server to perceive an aesthetic concept not related to the article's
use."1 30 In Judge Winter's view, which was consistent with the tes-
timony of art experts at trial, any reasonable observer would find
the bicycle rack in issue to be ornamental sculpture.
13 1
As the Second Circuit's case law in this copyright area now
stands, therefore, judges listen to evidence about the process by
which an article is designed and make a judgment regarding the
"intertwining," or lack thereof, between function and aesthetics.
Judges do not try to determine the ability of a reasonable ob-
server's "mind's eye" to see a separate aesthetic aspect to a func-
tional object.132
In the area of utilitarian design, as with fair use, the court has
attempted to articulate standards by which necessarily aesthetic
127 Id.
12 Id. at 1151 (Winter, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1152 (Winter, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 1151 (Winter, J., dissenting).
... Id. at 1151-52 (Winter, J., dissenting).
"2 The relationship between sculpture and a functional product has been raised subse-
quently, but the court decided the case without reaching this issue because the plaintiff had
obtained the copyright registrations fraudulently. See Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Cos-
tumes Co., 891 F.2d 452, 456 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Goldberg & Bernstein, Of Nose Masks
and Pumpkins: Protection of Costumes, 204 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1990, at 3, col. 1 (discussing
principle of conceptual separability and evaluating its impact on copyright case law involv-
ing costumes).
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judgments can be made. Unlike the Second Circuit law of factual
compilations, these two areas show articulated efforts to advance
beyond "I know it when I see it" jurisprudence. It seems fair to
ask, however, whether the court is not unduly reluctant about ac-
cepting aesthetic judgments as the basis for distinctions in copy-
right law involving industrial designs or, indeed, across the board.
The court's majority evidently accepts the need for judges to make
distinctions regarding what is functional, as opposed to aesthetic,
and it seems comfortable with judicial administration of a test that
depends on rather subjective notions of "intertwining" of form and
function. The result appears to be that judges still make essentially
aesthetic judgments about functionality and sculptural works
largely on the basis of "knowing it when they see it," while at the
same time saluting Justice Holmes and proclaiming that they
should not be seen as intruding into forbidden territory as art crit-
ics. The basis for decision would be more apparent if the court ac-
cepted the trier of fact's ability to decide separability on the basis
of frank aesthetic judgment such as that proposed by Judges New-
man and Winter.
CONCLUSION
Judge Learned Hand, an important contributor to Second Cir-
cuit copyright law, wrote that decisions on the question of
copyrightability "must . . . inevitably be ad hoc. 13 3 It seems
equally inevitable that issues of aesthetic judgment, which are dif-
ficult to articulate, regularly will form part of the basis for these
decisions. This should be no cause for alarm, so long as the judg-
ments made are articulated-even at the risk of exposing the
judges as sometime literary or art critics-and thus form a pattern
of reasonable predictability.
"31 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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